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“There seems to be a tide in Europe that is setting against 
the imposition of very lengthy terms of imprisonment that 
are irreducible.”
Lord Phillips, then lord chief justice and now the first 
president of the new Supreme Court of the United King-
dom, expressed this view in 2008 in the Court of Appeal 
in R v. Bieber.1 This pronouncement is an indication that 
an important shift is being recognized, and is being 
reflected at the highest European judicial level. The shift 
of attitude is supported by a recommendation from the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture that all 
individuals sentenced to life imprisonment should be 
given a prison regime that prepares them for release.2 
Underlying both, however, is more than a scintilla of 
doubt about how far the current European legal position, 
as expressed in early 2008 by the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Kafkaris v. 
Cyprus,3 goes toward outlawing irreducible sentences. 
One issue needs to be clarified immediately: There is 
no doubt about the position as far as children—that is, 
people under the age of 18 years—are concerned. An irre-
ducible sentence of life imprisonment cannot be imposed 
on a child in any European country. In fact, the majority of 
European countries do not allow life sentences to be 
imposed on children at all.4 Even countries that do allow 
indeterminate sentences to be imposed on some children 
are bound by article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, which explicitly prohibits the imposition of 
“imprisonment without possibility of release . . . for 
offences committed by persons below eighteen years of 
age,” and therefore requires procedures for considering 
their release. 
Moreover, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has put the 
matter beyond doubt. In Weeks v. United Kingdom, the 
ECtHR held that a discretionary life sentence imposed on a 
17-year-old was acceptable only because he had a real pros-
pect of release, and required that additional procedural due 
process guarantees be put in place for consideration of his 
release.5 In Hussain v. United Kingdom, the argument was 
extended to the mandatory sentence of a child for murder.6 
Finally, in V v. United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR underlined the importance in these cases of having 
robust release procedures and of promptly stipulating a 
clear and relatively short minimum period after which 
release would have to be considered, particularly for cases 
in which the offender was very young at the time of the 
commission of the offense.7 
This line of cases not only illustrates further the “cli-
mate of international opinion” that the United States 
Supreme Court took into account in Graham v. Florida,8 
when it declared unconstitutional life without parole for 
individuals under 18 convicted of offenses other than 
homicide, but also firmly contradicts a polemical aside  
by Justice Thomas in the same case. In a footnote to his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas commented that 
“democracies around the world remain free to adopt life-
without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders tomorrow 
if they see fit. Starting today, ours can count itself among 
the few in which judicial decree prevents voters from mak-
ing that choice.”9 This statement does not hold true for 
any of the forty-seven democracies that are signatories to 
the European Convention of Human Rights. If any of 
them were to introduce such a sentence for any person 
under the age of 18 years, even one convicted of homicide, 
it would clearly be struck down by a judicial decree of the 
European Court of Human Rights or one of the many 
national courts that apply the European Convention of 
Human Rights at the national level. 
In Europe, the debate has moved on to acceptability of 
such sentences for adults. In order to understand the doubt 
that still surrounds irreducible sentences for adults, this 
article first examines briefly the legal and actual position 
regarding life imprisonment in European countries, as well 
as the arguments that have been advanced about irreducible 
life sentences at the national level. This argument is not as 
simple as it seems, because which life sentences are irre-
ducible may itself be disputed. As will become apparent, 
this ambiguity arises in instances without a clearly set 
period after which prisoners sentenced to life imprison-
ment must be considered for release but where some other 
release process may theoretically still function—even if the 
actual prospect of release is very remote. 
After this opening overview, the article focuses on the 
European level, where the ECtHR, although it has moved 
a long way toward outlawing truly irreducible life sen-
tences, has struggled to define a clear position. The article 
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then considers the reactions to the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR at the national level, in European countries that 
retain apparently irreducible sentences. It pays particular 
attention to difficulties that courts face when they apply 
their analysis to offenders facing extradition to other 
countries, such as the United States, where irreducible life 
sentences may be imposed on them. In conclusion, the 
article considers the wider trajectory of European develop-
ments in this regard, which, it argues, are likely to lead to 
the clear outlawing of irreducible life sentences.
I.  European Countries with no Irreducible Life 
Sentences 
The current position, as far as it can be ascertained, is as 
follows: The majority of European countries do not have 
irreducible life sentences. These countries either have no 
life sentences at all or have a statutory provision requiring 
that all individuals who are sentenced to life imprison-
ment must be considered for release after having served a 
fixed period.
Countries that have no life sentences at all include 
Portugal, where life sentences are prohibited by the 
constitution,10 and Norway and Spain, where the criminal 
codes do not provide for them.11 Until 2008, Slovenia  
had no life sentences either, but in that year the law was 
amended, following a public controversy, to provide for 
life sentences that could be reconsidered after twenty-five 
years.12 
Countries that have fixed periods after which individu-
als sentenced to life imprisonment must be considered for 
release include Belgium, with a ten-year period;13 Austria, 
Germany, Luxemburg, and Switzerland with fifteen years; 
the Czech Republic, Romania, and Turkey with twenty 
years; Poland, Russia, and Slovakia with twenty-five years; 
Lithuania with twenty-six years; and Estonia with thirty 
years.14
The arguments in favor of having no life sentence at 
all and the arguments for having a fixed minimum period 
after which release must be considered have essentially 
the same foundation: No human being should be regarded 
as beyond improvement and therefore should always have 
the prospect of being released. Both the Spanish and the 
German constitutions are interpreted as giving prisoners 
this right. In the case of Spain, it is derived from prison-
ers’ constitutional right to be educated.15 In Germany, 
prisoners’ right to resocialization has been identified by 
the Federal Constitutional Court as being a component  
of people’s right to human dignity, as well as relating to 
the constitutional definition of the Federal Republic of 
Germany as a Rechtsstaat (state governed by the rule of 
law ) and also as a Sozialstaat (social welfare state). Such  
a state has obligations to its citizens that include the duty 
to provide prisoners with opportunities to resocialize 
themselves.16 
The conclusions drawn from these shared principles 
have differed. In Spain, the logical consequence of recog-
nizing the right to resocialization is that there should be 
no life sentences, because the state cannot be trusted with 
power that may allow it to exercise perpetual control over a 
citizen.17 In Germany, the conclusion has been more mea-
sured: Life sentences are constitutionally acceptable, but 
only if they are complemented by adequate provision for 
considering the release of prisoners on whom they have 
been imposed. 
The leading European case on the constitutionality of 
whole-life sentences at the national level is still the German 
Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of June 21, 1977.18 
At stake was no less than the constitutionality of the life 
sentence itself, which was challenged as being incompati-
ble with the principle of human dignity, the primary norm 
of the German constitutional order. The Constitutional 
Court rejected this frontal challenge. It noted that the 
prison system had a statutory duty to provide all prisoners 
with the opportunity for self-improvement, so that they 
could lead a crime-free life in the future.19 This duty 
applied also to those sentenced to life imprisonment: Life 
sentences would be compatible with the constitutional 
norm of human dignity if they left prisoners the hope that 
they could be released. However, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court went further and held that this principle, read 
together with the requirements of the Rechtsstaat, also 
required a clear release procedure, not just the prospect of 
an executive pardon. The procedure for releasing people 
sentenced to life imprisonment had to be spelled out in 
primary legislation that made provision for a court to 
decide on their release.20
In due course, the German legislature responded  
and inserted a new paragraph into the Criminal Code.21 
This paragraph provides that a court shall suspend the 
execution of the remainder of a sentence of life imprison-
ment if, inter alia, fifteen years of the sentence have been 
served, if the degree of the convicted person’s guilt does 
not require its continued execution, and if suspension can 
be justified upon consideration of the security interests of 
the general public. This provision has remained unaltered, 
although the Constitutional Court has clarified its mean-
ing. Clarification occurred most notably in 1992, when the 
Court held that the initial sentence should include a find-
ing about the gravity of the offense (die Schwere der Schuld) 
so that a subsequent court could use this finding as a 
guide when considering a prisoner’s suitability for release 
once the person has served the minimum period of the 
life sentence.22 
The German Constitutional Court has routinely upheld 
life sentences that were extended beyond the minimum.23 
Challenges to the ECtHR in this regard have proved fruit-
less, because the principle that the sentences are reducible 
has not been seriously undermined by these further 
developments.24 
II. Countries with Whole-Life Sentences
Countries without fixed periods after which release must 
be considered for all prisoners sentenced to life impris-
onment are a diverse group. Somewhat unexpectedly 
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prominent among them is the Netherlands, where all life 
sentences are imposed without the individuals sentenced 
having a clear prospect of release; since 1986, only one 
person serving a sentence of life imprisonment (who was 
terminally ill) has been released. However, the numbers 
are small, even by European standards. Life sentences are 
never mandatory and only thirty-seven prisoners are cur-
rently serving life sentences in the Netherlands, ten of 
whose verdicts still need to be finalized.25 
A second jurisdiction that has whole life sentences is 
England and Wales.26 There, no fixed period must be 
served before release is considered, but in every case where 
life imprisonment has been imposed (either because it is a 
mandatory sentence, as for murder, or because discretion 
to impose it has been exercised), the sentencing judge has 
to consider specifying a minimum period that the offender 
must serve.27 After the offender has served that period, his 
release is considered automatically (although whether he 
will in fact be released depends in practice on a wide range 
of factors, including whether he has been offered courses 
to improve himself and has been moved to an open prison 
where his suitability for release can be evaluated).28 
In the vast majority of cases, a minimum period is 
set. However, for a very small number, the judge declines 
to set a minimum period. Of the prisoners serving fully  
indeterminate sentences in English prisons in 2008, only 
thirty-six of the approximately 11,000 fell into this category.29 
The failure to set a minimum means that the prisoner can 
be detained indefinitely. Expressed differently, the mini-
mum period (or tariff, as it used to be called when it was 
set by the Home Secretary rather than the sentencing judge) 
of the life sentence for this small group of people was their 
whole life. 
Sentences without a minimum were explicitly upheld 
by the House of Lords, then court of final instance in  
England and Wales, in the leading case of R v. Secretary  
of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Hindley. Lord 
Steyn explained that “there are cases where the crimes are 
so wicked that even if the prisoner is detained until he or 
she dies it will not exhaust the requirements of retribution 
and deterrence.”30 Two further points are significant about 
this case. First, Hindley sought to appeal her case to the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, but died 
before she could pursue it. Second, some doubt exists 
about whether Hindley’s sentence was truly irreducible 
because, in the course of the appeal being heard before the 
House of Lords, the Home Secretary gave the court an 
assurance that he was prepared to reconsider the whole-
life tariff during the course of the sentence being served 
(at that stage, the Home Secretary rather than the sentenc-
ing court set this minimum period).
In France, the general rule is somewhat similar to that 
in England and Wales: Although most prisoners are con-
sidered for release after a minimum period, for a small 
group of individuals sentenced to life imprisonment, no 
minimum period is set. The French Criminal Code pro-
vides that most prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment 
may apply for parole after they have served a minimum 
period of eighteen years—or twenty-four years, in the case 
of recidivists. In 1994, however, the law was amended to 
allow for a sentence of life imprisonment with no mini-
mum period (perpétuité réelle ou incompressible) in cases of 
murder of a child under the age of 15 years accompanied 
by rape, torture, or acts of barbarity.31 The constitutionality 
of the provision was upheld by the Conseil Constitutionnel 
(Constitutional Council) in its decision of January 20, 
1994.32 
Whether this French provision amounts to an irreducible 
life sentence is dubious, however, because the possibility 
remains that someone may apply for release on license 
even before their minimum period has been completed if 
they can demonstrate serious evidence of readjusting to 
society. Where no minimum period has been set, such an 
approach cannot be made until thirty years have elapsed.33 
How this provision will work in practice is unclear; since 
1994, only three offenders have been sentenced to life 
imprisonment with no minimum period and none of 
them has been in prison for thirty years. 
There are other outliers, too. In Switzerland, the 
national Constitution was amended by referendum in 
2004 to provide that offenders convicted of sexual or vio-
lent crimes who are found by a court to be extremely 
dangerous and not susceptible to treatment should never 
be released.34 Their release is only possible if new scientific 
knowledge were to show that that they could be treated in 
order to render them not dangerous. In such cases, new 
expert opinions could be sought and, if these were posi-
tive, the prisoner could be released. Those who had given 
the opinions would then be personally responsible if the 
offenders reoffended. This draconian provision has in fact 
never been used, but, if it were to be, it would raise prob-
lems not only of human rights but also of medical ethics.35 
III.  the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human rights
The legal acceptability of any form of sentence in Europe 
depends not only on its recognition in national law but 
also on its not contravening the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Given the diversity of approaches to life 
imprisonment in general and to irreducible life sentences 
in particular among the countries of Europe, the issue of 
whether irreducible life sentences raised any questions in 
terms of the European Convention of Human Rights was 
always likely to arise.
The ECtHR’s initial approach to the issue of life 
imprisonment was understandably cautious. The Court 
has often emphasized that matters of sentencing fall 
largely outside the scope of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, although it has accepted that arbitrary or 
disproportionately heavy sentences could raise an issue 
in that they might infringe the prohibition against inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment in article 3 
of the Convention, the functional European equivalent of 
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.36 The 
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ECtHR has also emphasized that it is reluctant to inter-
vene in procedural matters relating to the enforcement of 
sentences—for example, with respect to whether a prisoner 
has been fairly considered for early release. 
This conclusion is supported by article 5(1) of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, which provides that 
the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a 
competent court justifies the deprivation of liberty. This 
justification normally remains in force, the ECtHR has 
held, for the period of the sentence. Therefore, parole pro-
cedures or even procedures relating to the return to prison 
of someone who has been released conditionally do not 
require further justification. In particular, the view is 
that article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights—which provides that “[e]veryone who is deprived 
of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall 
be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if 
the detention is not lawful”—does not apply to decisions 
to release individuals on parole or to re-imprison them 
before the end of their sentence, because these instances 
are covered by the legality of the detention resulting from 
the initial sentence.37 From this overall approach to sen-
tencing it therefore followed, as the ECtHR explained in 
Sawoniuk v. United Kingdom,38 that a life sentence could be 
imposed in a case of appropriate seriousness, even on an 
offender who was already relatively old at the time of the 
sentence, without running the risk of infringing article 3 
of the Convention. 
With respect to the procedural requirements of article 5 
for life sentences, however, the ECtHR’s approach was 
more nuanced. In a series of cases, the Court recognized 
that the primary English approach to life imprisonment—
which drew a clear distinction between the minimum 
period required for the purposes of retribution and deter-
rence and the subsequent continued detention for purposes 
of public protection—did involve the making of a new deci-
sion about continued detention after the expiration of the 
minimum period. The result was that both article 5(1) and 
article 5(4) were invoked to require a decision by a court-like 
body that met due process requirements to determine 
whether the continued detention of a person sentenced to 
life imprisonment was justified. The practical effects are 
that in England the trial judge, and not a Minister of State, 
sets the period after which the release of individuals sen-
tenced to life imprisonment must be considered (except for 
the few for whom no minimum period has been set), and 
the subsequent decision on release is taken by an appropri-
ately constituted, court-like parole board headed by a judge 
at the end of prisoners’ minimum period and at regular 
intervals thereafter.39
The question remained whether an irreducible life 
sentence, unlike other life sentences, might not still be 
inhuman or degrading and thus infringe article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In 2001, in 
Nivette v. France40 and subsequently in Einhorn v. France,41 
both cases involving extradition of offenders to face life 
sentences in the United States, the ECtHR indicated that it 
“did not rule out the possibility that the imposition of an 
irreducible life sentence may raise an issue under Article 3 
of the Convention.”42 The Court did not fully explain its 
reasoning but referred to resolution (76) 2 of the Council 
of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on the treatment of 
long-term prisoners, which included the recommenda-
tion that member states should ensure that all prisoners 
had the possibility of applying for conditional release. 
Although the resolution was not a binding rule of Euro-
pean law, the reference to it indicated at least a degree of 
judicial approval for the approach it supported. In the end, 
both Einhorn’s and Nivette’s cases were settled without 
coming to a final conclusion on this issue—the ECtHR 
held that neither applicant in fact would face an irreduc-
ible life sentence on conviction if their extradition went 
ahead.
Finally, in the 2008 case of Kafkaris v. Cyprus, it 
appeared as if the ECtHR would be compelled to settle the 
question of the acceptability of irreducible life sentences 
once and for all, because the matter was referred to the  
seventeen-judge Grand Chamber of the ECtHR as a matter 
of general importance. In the end, the outcome was decided 
on the facts again: Ten of the seventeen judges found that 
the sentence Kafkaris faced was not totally irreducible. 
The legal situation to which Kafkaris was subject was 
certainly confusing, because at that time individuals sen-
tenced to life imprisonment were routinely released after 
having served twenty years. The basis for this release was 
a Cypriot prison regulation but, in the course of Kafkaris’s 
sentence, this regulation was declared unconstitutional in 
an unrelated case. The result, as best could be ascertained, 
was that in theory Kafkaris could be released only if the 
president of Cyprus (who could only act subject to the 
approval of the attorney general) were to pardon him (¶ 
86). The Cypriot government conceded that this legal  
situation was unsatisfactory (¶ 91), but the majority never-
theless found that, both in law and in fact, there was a 
possibility, however remote, that Kafkaris could be 
released and that that was sufficient. 
Somewhat ironically, Kafkaris did succeed on one 
point: The Grand Chamber held by a large majority of fif-
teen votes to two that there had been a violation of article 
7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
provides that 
[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence 
on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under national or 
international law at the time when it was committed. 
Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one 
that was applicable at the time the criminal offence 
was committed.
The Grand Chamber, however, went out of its way to 
emphasize that it was not concluding that Kafkaris’s sen-
tence had retrospectively become a heavier sentence. 
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Kafkaris’s sentence had always been a life sentence, and 
changes in the mode of its execution did not, in the view 
of the Court, amount to the imposition of a heavier pen-
alty (¶ 151). Instead, the Grand Chamber was concerned 
with the question it called, in its own quotation marks, the 
“quality of the law.” It explained that
at the time the applicant committed the offence, the 
relevant Cypriot law taken as a whole was not formu-
lated with sufficient precision as to enable the 
applicant to discern, even with appropriate advice, to 
a degree that was reasonable in the circumstances, 
the scope of the penalty of life imprisonment and the 
manner of its execution. Accordingly, there has been 
a violation of Article 7 of the Convention in this 
respect (¶ 150).
The factual finding of the majority in Kafkaris that the 
applicant’s sentence was not irreducible does not exhaust 
the significance of this Grand Chamber judgment. For 
one thing, the majority judgment includes an exhaustive 
account of various instruments of the Council of Europe 
and the European Union that deal with the rehabilitative 
purpose of imprisonment and link it explicitly to the need 
for clear release procedures that will allow prisoners the 
possibility of eventually returning to life in a free society. 
At the Council of Europe level, reference is made in 
this regard to article 21 of the Convention on the Preven-
tion of Terrorism,43 which allows extradition to be limited 
in certain instances if the person who is to be extradited 
may be subjected to life imprisonment without the possi-
bility of release. Reference is also made to the 1976 
Resolution of the Committee of Ministers on the treat-
ment of long-term prisoners, which was based on an 
official memorandum that stated the case against irreduc-
ible sentences: 
[I]t is inhuman to imprison a person for life without 
any hope of release. A crime prevention policy which 
accepts keeping a prisoner for life even if he is no 
longer a danger to society would be compatible nei-
ther with modern principles on the treatment of 
prisoners during the execution of their sentence nor 
with the idea of the reintegration of offenders into 
society. Nobody should be deprived of the chance of 
possible release. Just how far this chance can be rea-
lised must depend on the individual prognosis.44
Further references to the desirability of parole are 
underlined in the 1999 Recommendation of the Commit-
tee of Ministers concerning prison overcrowding,45 the 
2003 Recommendation on conditional release,46 and the 
2006 European Prison Rules.47 
The judgment also noted that the European Arrest 
Warrant, which operates within the European Union, pro-
vides for a person who has been transferred on such a 
warrant from one country to another to have his life sen-
tence reconsidered after twenty years.48 It even referred to 
a provision requiring that the International Criminal 
Court consider the release of all individuals it had sen-
tenced to life imprisonment after they had served 
twenty-five years.49
This very long list of supporting evidence was comple-
mented by a carefully circumscribed outline of when the 
court might find that a life sentence infringed the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. The judgment 
emphasized that ill treatment must reach a certain mini-
mum level before it could be regarded as inhuman or 
degrading to a degree that infringed article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, and reiterated that a 
life sentence did not become irreducible merely because 
in practice it was served in full. The Grand Chamber 
acknowledged the earlier jurisprudence that had raised 
doubts about whether irreducible life sentences were in 
conformity with the Convention and confirmed that 
whether a life sentence was de jure and de facto reducible 
was a factor to be taken into account when assessing the 
compatibility of a particular life sentence with article 3. 
The majority of the Grand Chamber, however, went 
out of their way to emphasize that there was no unanimity 
in Europe about what procedures should be followed 
when releasing prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment 
and that they would not give any guidance on what such 
procedures should entail. In other words, states should be 
allowed what was effectively an unrestricted margin of 
appreciation in deciding what procedure to adopt.
The dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Cabral, Bar-
reto, Fura-Sandström, and Spielmann regarding article 3 
is also of much more significance than one might expect 
from what appears to be merely a factual disagreement 
with the conclusion that Kafkaris had a de facto possibility 
of release. In their view, not only did he not have such a 
possibility, but the whole approach to release adopted by 
the Cypriot authorities was flawed, because it could result 
in an arbitrary outcome. The dissenting judges based this 
conclusion not on the (manifest) shortcomings of the 
Cypriot procedures, but on an analysis of what they saw as 
the fundamental European approach that should underlie 
release decisions. 
To do this, they analyzed the many sources of Euro-
pean policy in this regard quoted by the majority (referred 
to previously). They noted that these instruments had 
“contributed and are still contributing to forming a genu-
ine body of law on sentences and prisoners in advanced 
democratic societies” (¶ 4) and criticized the majority for 
not paying more attention to the sources it had quoted so 
fully itself. Their own conclusion was that “once it is 
accepted that the ‘legitimate requirements of the sentence’ 
entail reintegration, questions may be asked as to whether 
a term of imprisonment that jeopardizes that aim is not in 
itself capable of constituting inhuman and degrading 
treatment” (¶ 5). In the absence of such an approach, they 
could not find that there had been a real consideration of 
Kafkaris’s release. They concluded by agreeing with the 
sentiment expressed by Judge Bratza in his concurring 
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opinion that the time had come for a clear ruling that irre-
ducible sentences were unacceptable in Europe. 
Although Judge Bratza concurred with the majority on 
the factual question of whether in practice Kafkaris had a 
prospect of release, he went further than they did in deal-
ing clearly with the question of the unacceptability of an 
irreducible life sentence. In his words, “[T]he time has 
come when the Court should clearly affirm that the impo-
sition of an irreducible life sentence, even on an adult 
offender, is in principle inconsistent with Article 3 of the 
Convention.”50 
Judge Bratza’s separate opinion is significant also for 
the light it sheds on potential procedural developments in 
this area. When the case was argued before the Grand 
Chamber, counsel for Kafkaris attempted to show that his 
rights under article 5(4) had been infringed. They sought 
to put forward the proposition that, if there was legal pro-
cedure for the consideration Kafkaris’s release, as the 
Cypriot government had claimed and the court found 
there to be, and if the exercise of this procedure was a con-
dition for the lawfulness of his continued detention, then 
such procedure should allow for adjudication before an 
independent tribunal and should meet other due process 
safeguards (analogous to those that had been required in 
terms of article 5(4) when the release of English life sen-
tenced prisoners had been considered after they had 
completed their tariff periods). In the event, counsel was 
prevented from raising this argument because they had 
not included it in their initial submissions to the Court. 
Judge Bratza, however, referred to this argument with 
apparent approval, although he, too, concluded that the 
Court was precluded from considering it fully. 
Iv. national reactions to Kafkaris
The reaction to the Kafkaris decision in England and in the 
Netherlands, the two primary jurisdictions that have 
retained life sentences that are arguably irreducible, has 
been to give the majority judgment the most restrictive 
interpretation possible. 
In R v. Bieber,51 the English Court of Appeal adopted a 
particularly narrow reading of Kafkaris,52 a reading that 
was subsequently upheld unanimously by the House of 
Lords in the case of Wellington.53 Then Lord Chief Justice 
Philips, who gave the judgment of the Court in Bieber, 
sought to demonstrate that Kafkaris did not prevent a 
court from imposing an ostensibly irreducible sentence; 
rather, it meant only that unjustifiably long detention of 
someone sentenced to life imprisonment could possibly 
infringe article 3. In my view, this distinction is without 
merit. If the sentence is irreducible as a matter of law 
when it is imposed, then it logically cannot be reduced  
at a future date. 
In fact, the position in England had become more 
restrictive than it had been at the time of the early leading 
case of Hindley, because the powers of the Home Secretary 
to intervene to release an offender sentenced to life impris-
onment had all but disappeared. All that remained was a 
provision that allowed the Secretary of State for Justice to 
order the release of a prisoner if he is satisfied that “excep-
tional circumstances exist which justify the prisoner’s 
release on compassionate grounds.”54 Although in practice 
this provision had been used only in cases of terminal ill-
ness, Lord Philips held that it was sufficient to meet the de 
jure and de facto requirements of a prospect of release that 
had been laid down in Kafkaris. 
In the Netherlands, too, the Hoge Raad, the court of 
final instance, in its judgment of June 16, 2009,55 took a 
narrow view of the requirements set in the Kafkaris case. It 
noted that in the modern Netherlands, release of a person 
sentenced to life imprisonment could be effected only by a 
pardon, because the previous policy of converting life sen-
tences into fixed-term sentences had lapsed. In its view, 
the existence of legislation governing pardons (the 
Gratiewet of 1987) and, in theory, a procedure that would 
allow a prisoner to approach the courts and argue that his 
life sentence should be set aside were sufficient to create a 
de jure prospect of release. The court refused to consider 
the de facto aspect of the Kafkaris test directly, holding 
simply that there was no evidence before it that prisoners 
sentenced to life imprisonment were not being released. 
The narrowness of both these decisions may rightly be 
criticized.56 They fail to consider the primary question of 
why irreducible life sentences are unacceptable. If they 
had done so, they would have recognized that irreducible 
sentences are founded on an a priori denial of the ability 
of this group of prisoners to reform sufficiently to enable 
them to become responsible members of society. Such an 
oversight is particularly glaring in the Netherlands, where 
the 1999 Penitentiary Principles Act, which applies to all 
prisoners, including those serving life sentences, states as 
its point of departure that the implementation of all prison 
sentences and measures of detention are to be used, as far 
as possible, to prepare inmates to return to society.57 In 
practice, Dutch offenders who are sentenced to life impris-
onment are not offered programs that will enable them to 
fulfill this objective because it is assumed that they will 
not be released.58 
Of further significance is the particular dilemma posed 
to courts in Europe when the attack on an ostensibly irre-
ducible life sentence is related to an extradition application. 
Such applications are often from the United States of 
America, where the offender may be subject to a manda-
tory life sentence without parole. Ironically, such a sentence 
may be a lesser penalty to accept, because extradition will 
routinely be subject to the condition that the death penalty 
not be imposed. 
On the facts, the reactions of national courts have been 
mixed. The House of Lords in England has held in Wel-
lington that returning an offender to the United States 
where he would face a life sentence if convicted would not 
amount to an infringement of his article 3 rights as inter-
preted by the ECtHR in Kafkaris, because even whole-life 
sentences could be set aside by gubernatorial pardon— 
although, as the House of Lords recognized, that is unlikely 
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to happen. The House of Lords indulged in a great deal of 
soul searching on whether a different standard should be 
applied to the absolute prohibition on torture and inhu-
man or degrading punishment when the application of 
article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
concerned an extradition matter. In the end, it accepted by 
a majority of three to two that, whereas torture was a clear 
concept, the meaning of the words inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in article 3 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights depended on their context. 
Strictly speaking, however, this conclusion was irrelevant 
in the light of their unanimous primary finding that, in 
any event, the article would not be infringed if the extradi-
tion of Wellington were allowed. 
In its decision of July 6, 2005, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court also allowed extradition of an 
offender who faced a whole-life sentence on the basis that 
he might be pardoned.59 It reasoned that, although the 
procedure that would be applied to the consideration of 
his release in the United States would not meet the due 
process standards of the German Constitution, the core 
values of the Constitution were not threatened by a foreign 
procedure as long as in practice the person serving a life 
sentence would have an opportunity to be considered for 
release. This judgment, like that in Wellington, is notewor-
thy because it accepts that offenders who face extradition 
will have a partial chance of release. 
Certainly in California, to which the offender would 
have been extradited from Germany, there is some evi-
dence that release was unlikely to be considered on the 
merits of the case,60 but neither the German court nor its 
English equivalent conducted such a factual inquiry. (In 
fairness, such an inquiry would be hard to undertake in 
practice, and in extradition cases courts tend to rely largely 
on diplomatic assurances.) The decision of the German 
Court, which of course preceded Kafkaris, was given with-
out reference to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, but it 
does draw a distinction between what national law must 
require regarding the release of individuals sentenced to 
life imprisonment and what is acceptable if they are tried 
abroad.
Against this background, the German Constitutional 
Court’s most recent decision with respect to a person fac-
ing extradition to a country where he could be sentenced 
to life imprisonment, handed down on January 16, 2010,61 
is all the more remarkable for the more stringent require-
ments that it sets. At issue was the extradition of a person 
to Turkey to face a charge of terrorism. On inquiry, the 
court that originally heard the matter was told that, if con-
victed, the offender would face an aggravated life sentence. 
However, the court was also told that the Constitution of 
Turkey gave the president the power to pardon someone 
sentenced to life imprisonment. More precisely, it was told 
that in terms of article 104 of the Turkish Constitution, 
the president of Turkey had the power “to remit, on 
grounds of chronic illness, disability, or old age, all or part 
of the sentences imposed on certain individuals.”62 On 
this basis, the initial court found that the matter was in 
pari materia with decision of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of July 16, 2005, and allowed the extradition to go 
ahead. 
In its decision of January 16, 2010, the Federal  
Constitutional Court disagreed. It reaffirmed that, not-
withstanding the requirement of international law that 
foreign legal orders were to be respected, if someone had 
no practical prospect of release, according to whatever pro-
cedure, such punishment would be cruel and degrading 
(grausam und erniedrigend). The Court then added:
that human dignity and the inalienable rights derived 
from the principle of the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprin-
zip) could also be infringed if a legal order provided 
that only severe infirmity or life threatening illness of 
a prisoner could lead to a life sentence not being car-
ried out further. This applies in any case, even if such 
circumstances are brought to the attention of the 
authorities but the return to freedom of the prisoner 
remains uncertain because he can only hope for an 
act of grace.
Against this background of principle, the Federal  
Constitutional Court noted that the power of the Turkish 
president to intervene was limited to certain specific  
circumstances. In its view, these circumstances were 
insufficient. As the Federal Constitutional Court 
explained: 
The specific requirement takes away from the offend-
er—notwithstanding the development of his 
personality—any hope of a self determined life in 
freedom. The [Turkish] power to pardon that is being 
considered here does not open even a vague prospect 
that of a life in freedom that makes the implementa-
tion of the life sentence bearable in terms of the 
dignity of the person in any way that would satisfy 
the German constitutional order: At best it lets the 
offender hope to die in freedom. 
It is worth emphasizing that this decision was reached 
not on procedural grounds, but because Turkish law 
ostensibly precluded a release on the grounds that the 
prisoner had been resocialized and therefore no longer 
posed a risk to society. Such an analysis could fruitfully be 
applied at the European level, too, because it recognizes 
procedural differences, thus allowing what in European 
human rights law is referred to as a margin of appreciation 
while making clear what factors must be considered under 
all circumstances. 
v.  the Future of the Irreducible Life Sentence  
in Europe
It seems likely that the European Court of Human Rights 
will have to clarify its thinking on life imprisonment in 
the near future, because it remains unclear what a de jure 
and de facto prospect of release really means. One way in 
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which this clarification could be accomplished would be 
to return to first principles and to ask, as the dissent in 
Kafkaris did most clearly (but the majority did implicitly, 
too), why individuals who are sentenced to life imprison-
ment should have a prospect of release. In this regard, the 
emerging European consensus around the idea that the 
human rights of individuals sentenced to life imprison-
ment require that they, too, be prepared for release, gives 
an indication that the rules governing release should be 
sufficiently flexible to allow a release on the grounds that 
the offender is now demonstrably capable of living in a 
free society without posing a danger to others. Expressed 
differently, a procedure that allows release only when the 
offender is at death’s door does not meet the requirements 
set by article 3 of a prospect of release for all prisoners. 
Some indication that key judges from the ECtHR are 
thinking along these lines emerges from the decision of 
the Grand Chamber in Léger v. France.63 This case involved 
an offender sentenced to life imprisonment whose release 
had long been delayed—he served forty-one years. Léger 
challenged the compatibility with the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights of the very long delay in granting 
him release. His application was turned down by a major-
ity of the Chamber of the ECtHR that initially heard it, but 
the matter was referred to the Grand Chamber because it 
raised a serious issue of general importance. Unfortu-
nately, Léger and his lawyer both died before the Grand 
Chamber could come to a conclusion in this case, and in 
March 2009 the Chamber decided by a majority not to 
proceed with the case.64 
Unusually for a procedural matter, a minority of four 
judges, headed by Judge Spielmann, the Luxembourgian 
judge on the Court, argued strongly that the Court should 
have continued to hear the case because the law in this area 
requires further development. Judge Spielmann referred 
extensively to the decision of the German Constitutional 
Court of June 21, 1977 (discussed previously), and argued 
that the principles it asserted should also be applied at the 
European level to ensure that individuals sentenced to life 
imprisonment should retain the hope of entitlement to a 
measure such as parole. 
The most recent German decision on extradition and 
life imprisonment should provide the ECtHR with addi-
tional material for further thought. Applying the German 
standard as developed in the decision of January 16, 2010, 
to the rest of Europe should logically lead to the conclu-
sion that the very limited provisions for release from life 
imprisonment in the Netherlands (as well as in England 
in those instances where minimum periods are not set by 
the sentencing court) are not adequate to ensure that these 
sentences are not de facto irreducible. 
In addition, it is likely that courts will recognize that 
issues about the lawfulness of continued detention are 
going to be raised whenever a decision is made about the 
possible release of prisoners serving sentences of life 
imprisonment for which no clear minimum period has 
been set. Article 5(4) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights is likely to be invoked to ensure that the pro-
cedures governing these decisions meet some minimum 
procedural standards. These procedures will not be uniform 
across Europe, because individual countries will continue to 
be allowed a margin of appreciation in deciding what form 
the procedures should take. Nevertheless, even in countries 
that may continue to use pardons as the primary way of 
releasing life-sentenced prisoners, some proceduralization 
of these decisions can be expected, too, with courts playing 
an increasingly prominent role in making them. Eventually, 
the procedure is likely to become fully judicialized.
In sum, there are sufficient indications, even in the 
Kafkaris decision (which for the time being is still the lead-
ing case in this area), that pan-European principles about the 
implementation of sentences of imprisonment recognize 
the fundamental dignity of all people and the importance of 
meeting basic procedural standards. For those serving life 
sentences, giving them a fair prospect of release while they 
may still be able to play a role in society is a way of applying 
these principles.65 One may confidently expect that this anal-
ysis will be developed further and that it will contribute to 
the unambiguous outlawing of irreducible life sentences in 
the near future. 
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